# Affirmative

## Framework

### At: Epistemology – Case O/Ws

#### Epistemological critique may decrease our ability to know the future with certainty, but this only supports defaulting to any risk of impacts large in magnitude-these are more important than small structural factors

TYLER **COWEN** **in** **2006** The Epistemic Problem Does Not Refute George Mason University Consequentialism Utilitas, Dec2006, Vol. 18 Issue 4, p383-399

**The epistemic critique increases the plausibility of what I call 'big event consequentialism'**. In this view, **we should pursue good consequences, but with special attention to consequences that are very important**and very good, or correspondingly, very bad. **This includes stopping the use of nuclear weapons**, saving children from smallpox, **making progress against**global **poverty**, and maintaining or spreading liberal democracy. **Big events**, as I define them, **typically are of significant practical importance,**involve obvious moral issues, and their value is not controversial to benevolent onlookers. In contrast, consider 'small events'. Preventing a broken leg for a single dog, however meritorious an act, is a small event as I define the concept. Making American families wealthier by another $20 also would count as a small event. **We should not count small events for nothing, but epistemic issues may well lower their importance in refiective equilibrium**. Of course we do not need a strict dividing line between big and small events, but rather we can think in terms of a continuum. In some cases a large number of small benefits will sum up to a big benefit, or equal the big benefit in importance. It then can be argued that we should treat the large benefits and the small benefits on a par. If we lift a different person out of poverty one billion times, this is no less valuable than lifting one billion people out of poverty all at once. Here two points are relevant. First, sometimes we are facing a single choice in isolation from other choices, rather than examining a rule or general principle of behavior**.**In this case it does not matter whether or not the small benefits would, if combined in larger numbers, sum up to a greater benefit. The small benefits will not be combined in greater numbers, and we should still upgrade the relative importance of larger benefits in our decision calculus. Second, **not all small benefits sum into equivalence with larger benefits**. **Sometimes one value has a lexical relationship to (all**or some) **other values**. For instance **arguably a large number of canine broken legs, even a very large number, do not sum in value to make a civilization. It does not matter how many dogs and how many broken legs enter the comparison**. In other words, civilization may be a lexical value with respect to canine broken legs. And when lexical elements are present, the mere cumulation of numbers of broken legs does not trump the more significant value. Numerous value relationships have been cited as lexical. A large number of slight headaches, no matter how numerous, may not sum up in value to equal a smaller number of intensely painful deaths or personal tortures." **A very large number of**'muzak and **potato' lives do not sum to overtake the value of a sophisticated civilization**.^^ Rawls put forward liberty and the difference principle as his lexical values for all political comparisons.^^ For our purposes, we do not require a very strict notion of lexicality for these designations to matter. A big value need not be lexical against a (multiplied) smaller value at all possible margins. Instead **the big value need only be lexical across the comparisons that arise under relevant policy comparisons.**Furthermore a big value need not be lexical in absolute terms against all other smaller values. **We therefore receive further guidance as to which big events are upgraded in the most robust fashion. The big values that receive the most robust upgrading would be those values with some lexical importance**, relative to possible comparisons against other smaller values.^" To sum up these pointsz**, critics of consequentialism would like to establish something like the following: 'We find it hard to predict consequences. Therefore consequences do not matter very much**, **relative to**other **factors, such as deontology**or virtue ethics. **We should abandon consequentialist morality.' But so far epistemic considerations have yet to produce a strong argument for this view. The arguments support a different conclusion, namely downgrading the importance of minor consequences, and upgrading the importance of major consequences. The most robust major consequences are those which carry values with some lexical properties**, and cannot be replicated by a mere accumulation of many small benefits.

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### At: Epistemology- Policy First

#### Evaluate the plan before epistemology – knowledge is always contextual and fractured which means specificity is key – focusing debate on abstract risk modeling is intellectual hubris.

Lake, Poli Sci Prof @ University of California San Diego, 14

(David, “Theory is dead, long live theory: The end of the Great Debates and the rise of eclecticism in International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations 19(3) 567–587, <https://quote.ucsd.edu/lake/files/2014/02/Lake-EJIR.pdf>)

\*ableism corrected In the end, I prefer progress within paradigms rather than war between paradigms, especially as the latter would be inconclusive. The human condition is precarious. This is still the age of thermonuclear weapons. Globalization continues to disrupt lives as countries realign their economies on the basis of comparative advantage, production chains are disaggregated and wrapped around the globe, and financial crises in one country reverberate around the planet in minutes. Transnational terrorism threatens to turn otherwise local disputes into global conflicts, and leave everyone everywhere feeling unsafe. And all the while, anthropomorphic change transforms the global climate with potentially catastrophic consequences. Under these circumstances, we as a society need all the help we can get. There is no monopoly on knowledge. And there is no guarantee that any one kind of knowledge generated and understood within any one epistemology or ontology is always and everywhere more useful than another. To assert otherwise is an act of supreme intellectual hubris. This is not a plea to let a hundred, a thousand, or ten thousand intellectual flowers bloom. Scholars working in cloistered isolation are not likely to produce great insights, especially when the social problems besetting us today are of such magnitude. All knowledge must be disciplined. That is, knowledge must be shared by and with others if it is to count as knowledge. Positivists and post-positivists are each working hard to improve and clarify the standards of knowledge within their respective paradigms. This is an important turn for both, as it will facilitate progress within each even as it raises barriers to exchange across approaches. So, if not a thousand flowers, it is perhaps better for teams of scholars to tend a small number of separate gardens, grow what they can best, and share when possible with the others and, especially, the broader societies of which they are part. Do not mourn the end of theory, if by theory we mean the Great Debates in International Relations. Too often, the Great Debates and especially the paradigm wars became contests over the truth status of assumptions. Declarations that ‘I am a realist’ or pronouncements that ‘As a liberal, I predict …’ were statements of a near quasi-religious faith, not conclusions that followed from a falsifiable theory with stronger empirical support. Likewise, assertions that positivism or post-positivism is a better approach to understanding world politics are similarly [misleading] blinding. The Great Debates were too often academic in the worst sense of that term. Mid-level theory flourished in the interstices of these debates for decades and now, with the waning of the paradigm wars, is coming into its own within the field. I regard this as an entirely positive development. We may be witnessing the demise of a particular kind of grand theory, but theory — in the plural — lives. Long may they reign.

### At: Structural Violence First

#### Structural violence framing is analytically useless – can’t distinguish war from other types of violence – the move to conflate the two makes politics ineffective

**Thomas 11** (Claire, Professor of International Politics at Sheffield University, “Why don’t we talk about ‘violence’ in International Relations?” *Review of Int’l Studies* 37 p. 1829-1831)

Much of the attractiveness of this idea of structural violence is that it broadens the remit of security studies, or of research into violence. Thus, economic issues and the damage done by poverty and so on become just as important as the damage done by direct, physical violence. Authors who work with the concept of structural violence aim to highlight the hidden structures in order to work towards their transformation.63 The problem with this is that it is defining a concept dependent on what we want to be able to study within its remit. A concept should not depend for its meaning on how we want to study it, but rather on what the concept means. The concept of structural violence is performing a similar role to the debate about broadening the definition of security. Within the security debate we are used to people posing the challenge of securitisation – that people call something a security problem in order to make it sound more urgent, more policy relevant and so on. One can pose the same challenge to structural violence. Rather than having a clear academic reason for stretching the concept of violence to incorporate other, equally bad, social ills, the main reason proposed is that these other social ills cause as much or more damage than the damage caused by violence. This may well be the case, and these issues should have urgent academic and policy attention. However, re-defining a concept like violence to incorporate these issues in order to gain that attention is a poor way of achieving this. A clear argument that states the reasons why wider social ills are more worthy of our attention does not need the further argument that we should also call them violence. So, by calling something violent, or designating it as an issue of security, an author is claiming a certain importance for the issue, escalating it up the policy agenda, and allowing for extraordinary reactions. For example, by saying that extremists use violence, one designates it as a significant and bad problem, which allows an exceptional response of violence (called military force) to counter it. The aim of calling something violence in order to push it up the policy agenda, meaning it requires special, urgent action, can also lead to dealing with these issues in a different, exceptional way, outside the realm of ‘ordinary’ politics. This may or may not be beneficial in dealing with the issue in question, or for our politics in general.64 A similar move is made by Žižek when he claims that alongside subjective violence (direct, intentional violence), there is also objective violence, one form of which is systemic violence – the damaging consequences of the ‘normal’ functioning of the system. This systemic violence must be taken into account, according to Žžiek, in order to make sense of subjective violence.65 He argues that this systemic violence needs to be given prominence, despite the urgency attributed to direct violence which fights for our attention.66 Again, this argument is valid in that systemic problems cause more suffering in the world than direct violence. But there has to be a further reason to also call this violence. After all, the argument can be made without the need to label something as violence. One could argue that seeing as our concepts are important because they change the way we think about the world, and change the way we act in it, a definition of violence that incorporates these other social ills would be valuable. However, broadening the concept in this way also has the potential for being damaging. If we conceive of all these things as equally violent, in order to see them as equally important, there is an implication that we are also going to tackle the issues as problems of violence. Issues of poverty are not helpfully tackled in the same way as issues of direct violence. The concept of structural violence is problematical as it means that the definition of violence becomes linked to the result of an act (or influence), and not to the intention or actual action of the actor. This illustrates a key difference in the way violence is conceived: one way sees violence from the perspective of the perpetrator, and sees it as intentional, destructive force; the other way sees violence from the point of view of the victim, and sees it as a form of violation.67 Bufacchi points out that these two concepts of violence stem from the Latin roots of the term. The root of the word violence is violentia, meaning a passionate and uncontrolled force, but the meaning is often conflated with ‘violation’, from the Latin violare, meaning ‘infringement’.68 Although the definition of violence is partly contingent on the result of an act, in that it requires that the intention is to physically harm the victim, it is also necessary for that result to be a means to an end, not an end in itself. Because the result of many different acts or situations is physical harm or death (or unequal power or life chances), many things become incorporated into the definition of violence if the concept of intention is not used, and if the instrumental nature of violence is ignored. Roberts goes some way to improving on the debate about structural violence by pointing out that structures are created by people, and thus structural violence can be prevented and does have responsible actors. He also operationalises it by referring to specific acts of structural violence, looking at avoidable civilian deaths. He argues that his way of looking at human insecurity enables the analysis of structures, institutions and human agency, but without the problems caused by broadening the debate to include Galtung’s concept of realising full human psychosomatic potential.69 But this does not prevent the problem that structural violence still refers to anything an author wants it to. Interestingly, many of Roberts’ choice of examples can be incorporated under the title of direct violence in any case (they are preventable female deaths: infanticide, maternal mortality, intimate killings (normal domestic murder, dowry murders and ‘honour’ killings), lethal female genital mutilation; and avoidable deaths in children under five).70 Some caution is needed in this approach, however. It is easy to think of examples where violence is not intentional, for example a natural disaster, or bombing an empty building that accidentally harms someone nearby. We have already recognised that the concept has fuzzy boundaries, and thus we can recognise that some violence occurs naturally. The point here is to discuss that violence which is most relevant for the study of international politics. This is not the same as accepting that everything that causes harm in some way can be captured within the term violence. It is also not going so far as to say that accidental acts of violence are not violence at all. Collateral damage is still violent. The point of including the idea of intentionality in the definition of violence is that it ensures the violence we are discussing in international politics has an actor and does not end up including indeterminate ideas like a state of violence. It does not just happen on its own. It is also an action that is done with the intention of harming, unlike acts such as a doctor causing some pain in order to heal.

#### Prioritize war impacts

John Horgan, Director of the Center for Science Writings at the Stevens Institute of Technology, 2012, The End of War, Chapter 5, Kindle p. 1600-1659

Throughout this book, I’ve examined attempts by scholars to identify factors especially conducive for peace. But there seem to be no conditions that, in and of themselves, inoculate a society against militarism. Not small government nor big government. Not democracy, socialism, capitalism, Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, nor secularism. Not giving equal rights to women or minorities nor reducing poverty. The contagion of war can infect any kind of society. ¶ Some scholars, like the political scientist Joshua Goldstein, find this conclusion dispiriting. Early in his career Goldstein investigated economic theories of war, including those of Marx and Malthus. He concluded that war causes economic inequality and scarcity of resources as much as it stems from them. Goldstein, a self-described “pro-feminist,” then set out to test whether macho, patriarchal attitudes caused armed violence. He felt so strongly about this thesis that he and his wife limited their son’s exposure to violent media and contact sports. ¶ But by the time he finished writing his 522-page book War and Gender in 2001, Goldstein had rejected the thesis. He questioned many of his initial assumptions about the causes of war. He never gave credence to explanations involving innate male aggression—war breaks out too sporadically for that—but he saw no clear-cut evidence for non-biological factors either. “War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although all of these influence wars’ outbreaks and outcomes,” Goldstein writes. “Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other injustices.” He admits that all his research has left him “somewhat more pessimistic about how quickly or easily war may end.” ¶ But here is the upside of this insight: if there are no conditions that in and of themselves prevent war, there are none that make peace impossible, either. This is the source of John Mueller’s optimism, and mine. If we want peace badly enough, we can have it, no matter what kind of society we live in. The choice is ours. And once we have escaped from the shadow of war, we will have more resources to devote to other problems that plague us, like economic injustice, poor health, and environmental destruction, which war often exacerbates. ¶ The Waorani, whose abandonment of war led to increased trade and intermarriage, are a case in point. So is Costa Rica. In 2010, this Central American country was ranked number one out of 148 nations in a “World Database of Happiness” compiled by Dutch sociologists, who gathered information on the self-reported happiness of people around the world. Costa Rica also received the highest score in another “happiness” survey, carried out by an American think tank, that factored in the nation’s impact on the environment. The United States was ranked twentieth and 114th, respectively, on the surveys. Instead of spending on arms, over the past half century Costa Rica’s government invested in education, as well as healthcare, environmental conservation, and tourism, all of which helped make the country more prosperous, healthy, and happy. There is no single way to peace, but peace is the way to solve many other problems. ¶ The research of Mueller, Goldstein, Forsberg, and other scholars yields one essential lesson. Those of us who want to make the world a better place—more democratic, equitable, healthier, cleaner—should make abolishing the invention of war our priority, because peace can help bring about many of the other changes we seek**.** This formula turns on its head the old social activists’ slogan: “If you want peace, work for justice.” I say instead, “If you want justice, work for peace.” If you want less pollution, more money for healthcare and education, an improved legal and political system—work for peace.

## Alt

### Alt Fails- Incremental Key

#### Refusing all U.S. engagement won’t solve -- you should prefer incremental reform that reduces U.S. imperialism while retaining beneficial presence

Swanson 18 (David Swanson -- 2015 Nobel Peace Prize Nominee; author/activist/journalist/radio host, “Isolationism or Imperialism: You Really Can’t Imagine a Third Possibility?”, Foreign Policy Journal, https://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2018/12/28/isolationism-or-imperialism-you-really-cant-imagine-a-third-possibility/, 28 December 2018)

Of the United Nations’ 18 major human rights treaties, the United States is party to 5, fewer than any other nation on earth, except Bhutan (4), and tied with Malaysia, Myanmar, and South Sudan, a country torn by warfare since its creation in 2011. The United States is the only nation on earth that has not ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child. It is the only country to have pulled out of the Paris Climate Agreement. It is by many measures a top destroyer of the natural environment, yet has been a leader in sabotaging climate protection negotiations for decades. Seven countries and the European Union reached an agreement on Iran and nuclear energy, but the United States uniquely withdrew. President Donald Trump is threatening to withdraw, and Congress is threatening to allow it, from critical nuclear disarmament treaties reached by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev.¶ The United States not only stands outside the International Criminal Court, but openly threatens sanctions against it and against nations that support it. The United States leads opposition to democratization of the United Nations and easily holds the record for use of the veto in the Security Council during the past 50 years, having vetoed U.N. condemnation of South African apartheid, Israel’s wars and occupations, chemical and biological weapons, nuclear weapons proliferation and first use and use against non-nuclear nations, U.S. wars in Nicaragua and Grenada and Panama, the U.S. embargo on Cuba, Rwandan genocide, the deployment of weapons in outerspace, etc.¶ Contrary to popular opinion, the United States is not a leading provider of aid to the suffering of the world, not as a percentage of gross national income or per capita or even as an absolute number of dollars. Unlike other countries, the United States counts as 40 percent of its so-called aid, weapons for foreign militaries. Its aid as a whole is directed around its military goals, and its immigration policies have long been shaped around skin color, and lately around religion, not around human need — except perhaps inversely, focusing on locking up and building walls to punish the most desperate.¶ Keeping the above context, discussed at greater length here, in mind, let’s add to it one other set of facts. Unarmed civilian protectors and nonviolent peaceworkers from groups like Nonviolent Peaceforce have been proving for many years that people can accomplish more without guns than with them. Thorough studies of violent and nonviolent campaigns over the past century have well established that principally nonviolent efforts are more likely to succeed and those successes virtually guaranteed to be far longer lasting. A consensus has developed even within military establishments that much of what militaries do is counterproductive on its own terms, so much so that “there is no military solution” has practically become a required mantra to be pointlessly but accurately repeated by those attempting military solutions. The tools of diplomacy, cooperation, aid, nonviolent investment, the rule of law, skilled conflict resolution, disarmament, and peaceful conversion have become extremely well-developed and understood, if hardly ever thought of or employed or widely communicated.¶ Now, keeping all of that in mind, does anything strike you as odd about exclamations that withdrawing U.S. troops from a war is a form of “isolationism”? Is there anything peculiar about the scores of people steadily emailing me to condemn a planned protest of NATO as, you guessed it, “isolationism”? Five years ago, there was a debate over whether to bomb Syria flat, and those opposed to doing so were accused of “isolationism.” Now the idea of pulling troops out of Syria or Afghanistan or ceasing to help bomb and starve the people of Yemen is subjected to the same rhetorical assault. That Trump promises to keep the occupation of Iraq going is understood as reassuring “engagement with the world” by people who demanded an end to the occupation of Iraq when George W. Bush was president, and who pretended to celebrate its ending when Barack Obama pretended to end it.¶ This is simple-minded thinking in the extreme, notwithstanding its claims to be just the opposite. “I’m against war but we can’t be simplistic about it and just end one of them willy-nilly, abandoning our allies.” This is the type of language used to support imperialism in the great debate between isolationism and imperialism, a debate wholly dependent on the ridiculous pretense that these two choices constitute the full range of possible human behaviors.¶ A lot of people no longer fall for such sophistry when it comes to domestic politics. “Should we ignore drug users or lock them up?” The obvious answer of “No, we shouldn’t do either of those things,” actually occurs to a good many people unprompted. “Should we allow shoplifting or imprison shoplifters for the rest of their lives?” This is a question so patently stupid that it will actually elicit from some people asked it the creative response: “Why not end poverty instead? It’s not like we don’t have plenty of money to do that!” But what about this question: “Should we keep the U.S. military engaged in each of these wars or ignore and abandon and forget about and forsake the people there?” Ah, now we have a patently stupid question that has been repeated so many, many times that it’s hard to hear the stupidity of it.¶ Each year that a war gets worse while continuing somehow fails to constitute outrageous proof that it should not have been continued. The past year of the war on Afghanistan has been one of the deadliest, yet it is the fear that things might go badly after U.S. troops leave that is supposed to concern us. And we are supposed to be powerless to do anything about it other than increase the bombings or avert our eyes to focus on blaming peaceniks. Here’s another idea that I think has been proposed so infrequently in part because most people either find it unthinkable or find it too obvious to bother saying: What if we were to try an approach of real anti-isolationism?¶ What if the United States were to sign and ratify and abide by the major laws of the world, support the world’s systems of justice, cooperate in disarmament (including the nuclear weapons ban treaty), collaborate on climate protection, provide humanitarian aid on an unprecedented scale (albeit miniscule in comparison with military spending), jumpstart a reverse arms race, democratize the United Nations, participate in truth and reconciliation hearings, invest in unarmed peacekeeping, cease arming and training brutal dictatorships, and actually back democracy abroad and by its own example?¶ The son of the last dictator the United States imposed on Iran is waiting hopefully in Bethesda, Maryland, for the next U.S. overthrow of the Iranian government, while Iran has not picked out a future King of America. What if the United States ceased worrying about rogue nations and focused on ceasing to be one?¶ But, you may object, none of that fantasy is going to happen this week, while meanwhile the Kurds are going to be massacred without their U.S. military friends. Back here in the real world, in which the United States and its allies are going to go on flooding the Middle East with weapons and using war as foreign policy, each war must be continued until . . . well, until a fantasy becomes possible, or Jesus comes back from wherever he’s been, or the Democrats take the throne but don’t act like, you know, the Democrats have always acted, or something! Of course, we all know what the something is going to be: climate collapse, the Middle East becoming uninhabitable for humans, and extreme weather disasters in much of the rest of the globe. And the response to this shocking if completely predictable and predicted development will be violence or nonviolence, depending on what we have been conditioned to suppose is normal or “natural” or “inevitable.”¶ Given that what is at stake here is human survival, given that the U.S. presidency has been gradually endowed with imperial powers such that the fate of thousands of people can be determined by a tweet, are we really obliged to limit our short-term thinking to (a) “support the troops” by keeping them in a desert exchanging bullets with the locals, or (b) “abandon” people? Why not demand of the U.S. government and/or other nations purporting to care about humanity, immediate announcement of an end to the weapons trade, the opening of diplomatic talks with all relevant parties, the commencement of a major aid program, and support for a major new program of unarmed peacekeeping through a coalition of the decent or if possible through a United Nations in which the United States foreswears the veto?¶ Such an alternative to the imperialism-or-isolationism trap is no more difficult to think of or to act on than treating drug addiction or crime or poverty as reason to help people rather than to punish them. The opposite of bombing people is not ignoring them. The opposite of bombing people is embracing them. By the standards of the U.S. communications corporations Switzerland must be the most isolationist land because it doesn’t join in bombing anyone. The fact that it supports the rule of law and global cooperation, and hosts gatherings of nations seeking to work together is simply not relevant. How about in the new year at least we try a little new thinking?

### Alt Fails- Realism

#### State-centric and realist analysis are inevitable- the alt can’t effect other countries’ beliefs- default to the aff’s minimization of threats

**Agnew 2k15** (John, professor of geography at UCLA, The Geopolitics of Knowledge About World Politics: A Case Study in U.S. Hegemony)

In fact, **considerable energy in academic international relations today in the United States and elsewhere focuses on the weaknesses of the neorealist synthesis** even as the master’s programs continue to churn out would-be practitioners often oblivious to the political and theoretical bases of the arcane debates among some of their teachers (Long et al., 2005 ). The continuing, even revived, appeal of the neorealist synthesis seems to lie in its ritual appeal to U.S. centrality to world politics (the “necessary nation,” “the lender of last resort,” etc.) and in the enhanced sense since the end of the Cold War and after 9/11 of a dangerous and threatening world that must be approached with trepidation and preparation for potential violent reaction and intervention as mandated by realist thinking. Yet in practice there is a massive gap between the predictions of such theorizing and what actually goes into the making of U.S. (or any other) foreign policy, much of which has to do with persisting geopolitical orderings of the world and domestic interests and their relative lobbying capacities (Hellmann, 2009 ; Oren, 2009 ). **International relations as a field around the world has followed largely in American footsteps.** I can attest that my own introduction to it in the late 1960s in Britain involved reading textbooks that came overwhelmingly from the United States. Debate about the relative degrees of theoretical “pluralism” in the United States and Britain suggests that at least the modes of categorizing theories are somewhat less hidebound in the latter than in the former and that in recent years at least there has been something of a parting of the ways across the Atlantic, with nonrealist views becoming much more widespread in British universities than in their American counterparts (Schmidt, 2008 ; Smith, 2008 ). More recently and elsewhere around the world, **U.S. theories, particularly neorealism, have proved rather more pervasive and persistent.** **In Russia**, for example, which one might not expect to be particularly congenial to U.S. ideas**, the main academic journal about world politics, Mehdunarodnyye protsessy (International Trends), seems to adhere to ideas about international anarchy, nation-state developmentalism, and systemic constraints on state action that are remarkably similar to those represented by U.S. neorealism.** Even the more liberal currents, refl ecting on globalization and a less state-oriented world, mainly cite U.S. sources (Tsygankov & Tsygankov, 2007 ). Perhaps this tendency refl ects the lack of local alternatives following the demise of offi cial Marxist conceptions, dependence on funding from Western foundations, and a general disorientation following the collapse of the Soviet Union. It does not, however, entail much by way of support for U.S. foreign policy, only a similar theoretical logic in arriving in this case at Russiancentered positions (Müller, 2008 ). The recent revival of Eurasian geopolitical thinking perhaps is a harbinger of a more Russian-centric mode of thinking as an alternative to imported brands (Tsygankov & Tsygankov, 2004 ). Given the cumulative crisis of the United States in world politics over the past two decades, one might expect to see some emerging alternative theoretical visions emanating from beyond U.S. shores. The so-called English School of international relations, associated in particular with the idea of “international society” but effectively realist in many respects, has recently undergone a concerted revival as an alternative to U.S. theories. It has certainly traveled well beyond Britain, even if with questionable success (e.g., Waever, 1992 ; Wendt, 1999 ). Zhang ( 2003 ) has examined how well it has traveled to China since Adam Roberts, one of its main advocates, visited Beijing in 1991. Lacking in equivalently talented entrepreneurs or salesmen and the institutionalized connections between U.S. and Chinese universities, the English School has had limited infl uence, according to Zhang, in comparison to the continuing dominance of U.S. scholars. But most of the main works are also not available in Chinese, and the major research institutes in China are run by people trained in the United States. **To a large extent, therefore, academic Chinese knowledge of the “international” largely remains refracted through intellectual lenses made in the United States**. Within China, however, change is in the offing. Some Chinese academics write explicitly about what they term “international relations theory with Chinese characteristics” (Xinning, 2001 ). In other words, China has become involved in developing something akin to what happened in the United States in the 1940s and 1950s. What is this Chinese synthesis? According to Xinning ( 2001 ), there are two variants, with the second smaller but growing more quickly. The fi rst borrows the phrase “Chinese characteristics” from Deng Xiaoping to indicate an international relations theory that centers on China’s need to protect its sovereignty, engage in peaceful coexistence with other states, and use Chinese language, thought, and expression. The second asserts a more radically Chinese vision of the world with China’s status at the center of a surrounding system, Confucian “benevolent governance,” the winning of confl icts without resorting to war, and interests, not morality, as the basis of interstate behavior. In Xinning’s words: After the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989, most social science disciplines (especially political science, sociology, and journalism) suffered a setback because of the government’s campaign against the ideological liberalism of Chinese scholars and the so-called peaceful evolution initiated by the West. However, International Relations received a different treatment. Theoretical studies on IR continued to develop. **The teaching of Western IR theories continued at key universities, and academic exchanges with the West in IR studies became more active. This was mainly because Chinese leaders worried more about China’s isolation from the outside world than a “peaceful evolution**.” (Xinning, 2001 , p. 62) More recently, as Xinning makes clear, a new Chinese international relations is evolving which combines a range of elements (also see Yang & Li, 2009 ). **As in the U.S. case, however, it is its connection to state policy that gives it special status. As in so many other features of the relationship between the United States and China, there is an almost mirror image in assumptions between the theory imported from the United States and what increasingly goes for “Chinese” international relations theory.** Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose. In brief compass, I have tried to illustrate one facet of the geography of knowledge, what I have called the geopolitics of knowledge, in relation to one body of thinking, so-called international relations theory. I have emphasized its founding in the early postwar United States, its travels around the world as a function of American hegemony, and the story of two alternatives, the English School, to illustrate the limits of pluralism, and the rise of an IR theory with “Chinese characteristics,” to show how an alternative with hegemonic potential can begin to emerge. Who knows, particularly if this latter, as Callahan ( 2001 ) has said in direct response to Xinning’s ( 2001 ) essay on Chinese thinking about world politics, adjusts to the more globalized and transnational world that has seemed, at least until recently, to be in the offing, then we may actually end up with a theory of world politics that avoids the inside–outside views of sovereignty and the need for a single hegemonic power that so much of recent IR theory has been devoted to normalizing (Agnew, 2009 ). Don’t bet your house on it. **As long as we have global political hierarchy, we are likely to have parallel “theories” of world politics which naturalize that state of affairs.**

#### Realism is human nature. Critique does nothing to stop states from struggling for power

Schweller 99 (Randall L. is Professor of Political Science, Director of the Program for the Study of Realist Foreign Policy, a Social and Behavioral Sciences Joan N. Huber Faculty Fellow at Ohio State University, and editor-in-chief of Security Studies, Forum: fantasy theory)

The problem is that Linklater argues by fiat rather than by the weight of hard evidence, which is in scant supply here. Again and again, radical propositions are supported by nothing more than references to some other critical theorist who shares Linklater’s vision and/or tendency to rely on slippery, undefined and unmeasured concepts, primarily globalisation and fragmentation. This simply will not do. **Whether Linklater, or Kant, or Marx, or Habermas, or other contemporary critical, feminist, postmodern theorists believe that something will happen,** must happen, **can happen, and should happen, does not make it so**—or likely to be so—in the foreseeable future. Moreover, **as a work of critical political theory, it is neither very critical nor very political**. **To believe, for instance, that the goals of the triple transformation will be advanced by wider dialogic relations, one must naively assume not only that there is an underlying global harmony of interests from which a consensus can be forged on important political and social issues, but that such ‘agreements will not be reached by ignoring or suppressing marginal and dissident voices’** (p. 41). In this view as in others, **Linklater simply skates over the central rationalist-realist explanations for international conflict and the struggle for power and security, e.g., states have an incentive to misrepresent private information about their capabilities and resolve**, and they may be unable to commit credibly to uphold bargains that they would mutually prefer to war;1 the nature of many international disputes are indivisible and therefore do not admit compromise; states exist under conditions of material and social scarcity with no sovereign arbiter to settle and enforce distributional disputes. **As long as things commonly enjoyed cannot be commonly shared, individuals and groups will seek to influence and control others and their environment; that is, they will struggle for social and material power. That is what politics is all about and what distinguishes it from other modes of human behaviour.** Politics so defined is largely absent from Linklater’s book. **Leaving aside the problem of indivisible scarce goods, a meaningful reduction in global material inequality would require significant sacrifices from those enjoying the good life. Surely, no one really believes that the ‘haves’ will voluntarily hand over their riches to the ‘have-nots’. There is no historical precedent for such altruism on a global scale, and, no matter how much we all communicate with each other in the future, I cannot imagine that human nature will change so dramatically in my lifetime.** Thus, unless one desperately wants to believe in this alternative future world, Linklater’s book will appear as little more than an intellectual exercise in historical speculation and theoretical wishful thinking along familar liberal lines.

## Perm

### Perm Best- Policy Solutions

#### Political analysis is a mechanism in which we can learn to challenge current issues, find effective alternatives, and create better political solutions.

Hird 17 [John Hird, Dean of the College of Social and Behavioral Sciences and Professor of Political Science and Public Policy, University of Massachusetts Amherst. “How Effective is Policy Analysis,” in D. Weimer & L. S. Friedman (eds.) *Does Policy Analysis Matter? Exploring Its Effectiveness in Theory and Practice*. University of California Press. 44-76.]

Classical policy analysis, however absent from actual policy making, remains an important vehicle for teaching policy analysts the connections between their analysis and the policymaking world in which their recommendations would live. Even if it implies more power than analysts will ever have, classical policy analysis teaches that politics, law, implementation, social structures, organizational behavior, and other factors are critical to policy outcomes and must play key roles in thinking through possible ways to address policy problems. Bringing policy ideas to fruition, bridging the worlds of research and policy making, is a critical skill for analysts to develop.¶ In addition, policy schools are instilling in prospective policy analysts the structure and habits of mind to engage successfully in the policy enterprise. 28 Teaching disciplined thinking for public service is important. Policy analysts not only have a problem-oriented, interdisciplinary approach to policy and the ability to synthesize and bring policy relevance to problems that social scientists are not trained for, but they understand the "rational lunacy of policy-making systems" (Weiss 2009).¶ In the absence of written classical policy analyses, policy analysts become their human embodiment. Their training will provide a mental picture of how a classical policy analysis should be performed. They can derive elements of policy analysis from writing position papers, briefing policy makers, and controlling meetings. They anticipate counterarguments and frame their analyses recognizing alternative options. In short, the mental map of a policy analysis allows good policy analysts not only to be effective in their jobs but also to advance into the public debate the appropriate elements of a policy analysis. Further, the problem orientation of policy analysis focuses at least some attention on social problems, not just political expediency. The role of policy analysts is not merely to translate research for policy makers, but to use creative means to turn available knowledge about the implications of various policy options into actionable policy recommendations appropriate for their clients. This is a subtle skill requiring attention to both political realities and the best available research.¶ Finally, prospective policy analysts are instructed repeatedly about the importance of their relationship to the client(s), yet far less attention is paid to the other part of the policy analyst's relationship: to the community of knowledge producers. Policy analysts play critical roles as intermediaries between "custodians of the knowable" and policy makers. Their training should include the ability to understand and interpret the academic literature on a topic at a far deeper level than most journalists have the time or, often, the analytic skill set to uncover. Identifying and connecting pertinent knowledge and analysis with policy makers should be a core principle of a public policy education. Policy analysts may offer the central means to provide policy makers with the key elements of classical policy analysis, though not in the way, through written reports, it was originally conceived. Creating a profession for committed, accomplished, and well-trained individuals to participate in the world of public policy may be among the most important contributions of policy analysis education.

### Perm Best/Alt Fails- Specific Policies key

#### Perm is the best option- the alt’s universalizing rhetoric papers over nuance- prefer the aff’s ability to target and address specific threats of violence

Browning & McDonald 13 (Christopher S., University of Queensland, c/o Political Science and International Studies and Matt, University of Queensland, “The future of critical security studies: Ethics and the politics of security,” European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 19, No. 2, pg. 248-251)

If the critical security studies project is deficient in providing us with a sophisticated and convincing understanding of either the politics or ethics of security — two core animat - ing themes of its research agenda — where does this leave such a project? Does the contribution of critical security studies extend no further than a compelling critique of traditional approaches to security on a range of analytical and normative grounds? We would argue that there is a future in critical security studies. This future will ulti - mately be determined by the extent to which scholars recognize the limits and tensions of existing approaches (especially ‘Schools’) and take up the challenge of moving beyond first principles or universalized assumptions about security to engage in nuanced, reflexive and context-specific analyses of the politics and ethics of security. Indeed, we make such a case using the critical theoretical tool of immanent critique, defined here as a method of critique concerned with locating possibilities for progressive change in existing social and political orders. 6 In this context, we note in particular the possibility for building upon the tensions and limits in existing critical security studies scholarship to move this research project forward. We identify two key imperatives for this project by way of conclusion. The first of these imperatives concerns the need to develop understandings of the poli - tics of security that are context-specific; that recognize and interrogate the role of differ - ent security discourses and their effects in different settings; and that come to terms with sedimented meanings and logics without endorsing these as timeless and inevitable. In terms of context-specificity, the Western-centric nature of (critical) security studies has ultimately encouraged a focus on how security ‘works’ in liberal democratic settings. This is particularly applicable to the Copenhagen School framework, whose dichotomy between ‘panic politics’ and ‘normal politics’ ultimately suggests a conception of politics parasitic on a liberal democratic political context (see McDonald, 2008; Williams, 2003). While some have attempted to explore securitization dynamics outside these settings (e.g. Wilkinson, 2007), the framework itself continues to work with a security–politics dichotomy that may be wholly unfamiliar to those outside liberal democratic states. In a fundamentally illiberal state regime such as Burma or North Korea, for example, what does the language of security do and what does ‘normal politics’ mean? In what ways do different cultural, social and historical contexts determine different security logics, and how do these dynamics look in terms of communities above and below the state? And can we accept the claim that there is no difference in the logic or effects of securitization if security is understood as referring to the welfare of the most vulnerable in global soci - ety, for example, rather than the territorial preservation of the nation-state? Here, the failure to differentiate between logics of security on the basis of what understanding of security inheres in a particular discourse potentially blinds Copenhagen School and post- structural theorists of security to (the possibility of) difference in security dynamics and logics in different places, for different actors and at different times. In the case of the Copenhagen School, such parsimony might be in part a response to the desire to provide analytical boundaries around the study of security rather than ‘descend’ into contextual analysis (see Williams, 2010: 213–216), but it nonetheless results in a partial and (we would argue) Western-centric image of the politics of security. at University of Kansas Libraries on February 25, 2016 ejt.sagepub.com Downloaded from Browning and McDonald 249 Ultimately, these points suggest the need for far more nuance than is currently evident in critical security studies scholarship. As noted earlier, the critical security studies pro - ject appears bifurcated between opposing logics of security that position the logic of security as inherently pernicious (Copenhagen School, post-structuralism) or inherently progressive (Welsh School). In a sense, these ‘Schools’ correct the limits and tendencies of each other in important ways, suggesting (immanent) possibilities for a more nuanced understanding of the politics of security in the critical security studies project as a whole. Copenhagen School and post-structural theorists explore the logic of security that fol - lows from the dominant discourse of security in contemporary world politics, rightly cautioning against any assumed linkage between security and progress and pointing to the ways in which the promise of security can be used to justify illiberal practices. The Welsh School framework, meanwhile, recognizes that this dominant discourse of secu - rity does not necessarily capture the essence of security across time and space, in the process pointing to possibilities for progressive change in security dynamics and prac - tices. In a sense, these different approaches to the logic of security broadly reflect struc - tural and agential tendencies in International Relations more generally. We would argue that they suggest the need to take seriously the political limitations associated with domi - nant security discourses while recognizing and exploring the possibility for security to mean and do something different. A brief analysis of the different constitutive security logics underlying various secu - rity communities around the world provides ample evidence of the problems of univer - salizing claims about the politics of security. As Rumelili (2008) has noted, an instructive comparison can be drawn between the EU and ASEAN, in particular in terms of how these organizations’ conception of self-identity results in them relating themselves to otherness very differently. Propounding an inherently inclusive (i.e. democratic) identity and normative agenda, the EU is liable to locate otherness in an inferior position to itself, as something to transform and render acceptable/normal. Otherness is therefore something to be eradicated and to the extent to which it rejects transformation, it becomes destabilizing and potentially threatening. Such processes are, for example, clearly evident in the European Neighbourhood Policy (Browning and Pertti, 2008). In contrast, ASEAN operates with a largely exclusivist (i.e. civili - zational, geographic, ethnic) identity where norms of sovereignty and non-interfer - ence dominate. This, Rumelili suggests, facilitates more equitable relationships with otherness since the goal in such relationships is not one of conversion to the cause. In terms of the politics of security, what becomes evident here is how concepts of security and subjectivity are intimately connected to conceptions of identity and the limits of political community in different contexts. The second imperative for the future of the critical security studies project concerns the ethics of security. We advanced the claim that a shared concern with expanding the realm of dialogue underpins much of the critical security studies project, albeit to differ - ent degrees and in different ways. But to the extent that an ethics of security — a concep - tion of the good or progress regarding security — orients around a concern with such a position, this commitment needs to be acknowledged and defended. A range of pressing questions suggest themselves here, including the bases for prioritizing open dialogue; the relationship between spheres of deliberation and material conditions of existence; the at University of Kansas Libraries on February 25, 2016 ejt.sagepub.com Downloaded from 250 European Journal of International Relations 19(2) possibilities for and limitations to the establishment of open dialogue; and the broader relationship between dialogue and outcomes. Elaborating on these commitments would also entail engaging with the argument that movements towards greater dialogue could potentially encourage the desire to exclude power, identity, emotion and other central features of global politics (see Price, 2008). Where difficult questions emerge about this and other dimensions of an ‘ethical’ engagement with security — such as the role of violence in the Welsh School framework, for example (Peoples, 2011) — these need to be confronted. If there is a consistency across critical security studies scholarship in this sense, it is that ethical commitments are evident (in commitments to resistance, desecuritization or emancipation, for example) but are insufficiently developed to provide a genuine account of what constitutes ethical action regarding security. Indeed, immanent possibilities for the development of the criti - cal security studies project arise from these (often implied) commitments that need draw - ing out and examining in the context of difficult dilemmas in world politics. This process of drawing out ethical commitments should be viewed as a reflexive movement towards recognizing the assumptions and potential implications of one’s own theorizing, a posi - tion central to both broader definitions of Critical Theory (see Cox, 1981) and to the compelling critique of traditional security studies as insufficiently engaged with the eth - ics and effects of its own theorizing about world politics. And it needs also to be matched up with the preceding understanding of the politics of security. Is the expansion of delib - eration and movement away from violence, for example, always progressive, and does it require the rejection of security as a political category or its reform? The example of Australian debates around the arrival by boat of asylum-seekers in 2010 illustrates tensions and ambiguities at work regarding the ethics of security, particu - larly as understood in key critical approaches to the study of security. In that context, Labor Prime Minister Julia Gillard’s call for ‘a frank, open, honest national conversation’ about asylum and border security particularly encouraged the articulation of negative and exclusionary views of asylum-seekers, paradoxically rendering the (re)securitization of asylum in the Australian context more likely (see McDonald, 2011). Particularly strik - ing here was the Prime Minister’s suggestion that this national conversation should take place outside the limits imposed by political correctness that would otherwise discourage the articulation of right-wing or racist sentiments towards asylum-seekers. In this exam - ple, the apparent opening of dialogic space encouraged by the Prime Minister was inti - mately related to the movement towards exclusionary security logics and practices orienting around the imperatives of ‘border security’. The point of this example is not to illustrate the limits of open dialogue per se, but rather to illustrate two broader claims regarding the relationship between security and ethics in the critical security studies project that we make here. First, while normative preferences are evident, these are often insufficiently developed or robust to enable the ethical adjudication between different practices or outcomes. The normative preference for deliberation evident in the commitment to desecuritization, for example, is not suf - ficiently robust to enable us to engage with difficult questions concerning the forms of deliberation that should be encouraged or even the circumstances in which ‘hate speech’, for example, might be curtailed (on this, see Gelber, 2010). Second, and to return to the central argument of the article, the Australian example reminds us of the need to explore the implications of security conceptions and practices in particular contexts, rather than at University of Kansas Libraries on February 25, 2016 ejt.sagepub.com Downloaded from Browning and McDonald 251 assume that a particular security logic will inhere — or outcomes will follow — from the use of the term ‘security’ or a stated political commitment to ‘dialogue’. The core challenge for the critical security studies project is ultimately moving beyond critique and agenda-setting and towards a contextual analysis of security dynamics and practices in global politics. There is no question that a focus on the politics of security and the ethics of security are crucial intellectual endeavours too readily elided or ignored in traditional approaches to the study of security. For this reason alone we need a ‘criti - cal security studies project’. However, universalizing claims concerning the politics of security — found in the securitization framework and much post-structural engagement with security — must ultimately give way to nuanced analyses of the ways in which security is constructed and challenged in particular social, historical and political con - texts. A range of theorists have — in different ways — sought to engage with precisely this question, illustrating the various ways in which security dynamics ‘play out’ in dif - ferent settings in terms of constructing community (e.g. Bubandt, 2005), challenging identity binaries (e.g. Avant, 2007) or enabling space for different forms of political response (e.g. Doty, 1998/9). Yet these insights ultimately remain marginal to key ‘Schools’ and conceptual frameworks of security, and are too often forgotten in our search for the universal in a complex world. Beyond the development of nuance in our understanding of the ‘politics of security’, the critical security studies project urgently needs to move beyond normative ‘leaps of faith’ concerning the ethics of security. This particularly applies to the Copenhagen and Welsh School preference for dialogue as a progressive means of escaping exclusive and illiberal security logics and practices. While genuinely open dialogue regarding the construction of security and threat has much to recommend it, crucial here is the need for advocates to reflect upon and lay bare the bases upon which these claims are made in philosophical terms, and to reflexively examine the implications of alternative security conceptions and practices in analytical terms rather than assume particular dynamics to be progressive. This too suggests the need to move towards a focus on the particular social, historical and politi - cal contexts in which security is constructed and practised in global politics.

## Link Answers

### At: Liberal Institutions Link

#### global liberal institutions are inevitable and good – reforming them requires engagement and intellectual rejection causes genocide and nuclear war.

Shaw 99 (Martin, Professor of International Relations and Politics at the University of Sussex, November 9, “The unfinished global revolution: Intellectuals and the new politics of international relations”)

The new politics of international relations require us, therefore, to go beyond the antiimperialism of the intellectual left as well as of the semi-anarchist traditions of the academic discipline. We need to recognise three fundamental truths: First, in the twenty-first century people struggling for democratic liberties across the non-Western world are likely to make constant demands on our solidarity. Courageous academics, students and other intellectuals will be in the forefront of these movements. They deserve the unstinting support of intellectuals in the West. Second, the old international thinking in which democratic movements are seen as purely internal to states no longer carries conviction – despite the lingering nostalgia for it on both the American right and the anti-American left. The idea that global principles can and should be enforced worldwide is firmly established in the minds of hundreds of millions of people. This consciousness will a powerful force in the coming decades. Third, global state-formation is a fact. International institutions are being extended, and they have a symbiotic relation with the major centre of state power, the increasingly internationalised Western conglomerate. The success of the global-democratic revolutionary wave depends first on how well it is consolidated in each national context – but second, on how thoroughly it is embedded in international networks of power, at the centre of which, inescapably, is the West. From these political fundamentals, strategic propositions can be derived. First, democratic movements cannot regard non-governmental organisations and civil society as ends in themselves. They must aim to civilise local states, rendering them open, accountable and pluralistic, and curtail the arbitrary and violent exercise of power. Second, democratising local states is not a separate task from integrating them into global and often Western-centred networks. Reproducing isolated local centres of power carries with it classic dangers of states as centres of war. Embedding global norms and integrating new state centres with global institutional frameworks are essential to the control of violence. (To put this another way, the proliferation of purely national democracies is not a recipe for peace.) Third, while the global revolution cannot do without the West and the UN, neither can it rely on them unconditionally. We need these power networks, but we need to tame them, too, to make their messy bureaucracies enormously more accountable and sensitive to the needs of society worldwide. This will involve the kind of ‘cosmopolitan democracy’ argued for by David Held80 and campaigned for by the new Charter 9981. It will also require us to advance a global social-democratic agenda, to address the literally catastrophic scale of world social inequalities. Fourth, if we need the global-Western state, if we want to democratise it and make its institutions friendlier to global peace and justice, we cannot be indifferent to its strategic debates. It matters to develop robust peacekeeping as a strategic alternative to bombing our way through zones of crisis. It matters that international intervention supports pluralist structures, rather than ratifying Bosnia-style apartheid. Likewise, the internal politics of Western elites matter. It makes a difference to halt the regression to isolationist nationalism in American politics. It matters that the European Union should develop into a democratic polity with a globally responsible direction. It matters that the British state, still a pivot of the Western system of power, stays in the hands of outward-looking new social democrats rather than inward-looking old conservatives. As political intellectuals in the West, we need to have our eyes on the ball at our feet, but we also need to raise them to the horizon. We need to grasp the historic drama that is transforming worldwide relationships between people and state, as well as between state and state. We need to think about how the turbulence of the global revolution can be consolidated in democratic, pluralist, international networks of both social relations and state authority. We cannot be simply optimistic about this prospect. Sadly, it will require repeated violent political crises to push Western governments towards the required restructuring of world institutions.82 What I have outlined tonight is a huge challenge; but the alternative is to see the global revolution splutter into defeat, degenerate into new genocidal wars, perhaps even nuclear conflicts. The practical challenge for all concerned citizens, and the theoretical and analytical challenges for students of international relations and politics, are intertwined.

### At: Think Tanks/Experts Link

#### Think tanks and foreign policy experts are a necessary supplement for national security- they’re crucial for immediate policy-relevant research

Abelson 6 [Donald E. Abelson, McGill Queen’s Unviersity Press, *Capitol Idea: Think Tanks and U.S. Foreign Policy*, professor of political science at Western University, where he has served as director of the Center for American Studies, as chair of the political science department, and as the founding director of the Canada-US Institute, 2006]

Hundreds of think tanks have not taken root in the United States because of a perceived shortage of policy expertise. They have proliferated, if we follow the logic of Simon and Stevenson's argument, because of a lack of *specialized* expertise. New think tanks may be required to address the complex set of issues that have arisen in the post—September I Ith world, just as think tanks were created before and after World War II to assist policy-makers to confront a wide range of economic, social, and security concerns. What Simon and Stevenson are suggesting is not radically different from what Robert Brookings, Andrew Carnegie, and a group of engineers at Project Rand proposed decades ago. The rise of think tanks is also closely associated with the type of expertise and services they offer and their ability to satisfy the needs of policy-makers, journalists, opinion leaders, philanthropists, and corporate and private donors in ways that other institutions engaged in research and analysis cannot. For example, unlike university professors, who in most instances must balance the demands of teaching, research, and administration, policy experts at think tanks have the luxury of concentrating on what they do best — monitoring, analyzing, and commenting on timely and relevant policy issues. Experts at think tanks often publish books and articles that stimulate discussion in the academic community, but they are concerned primarily with generating a range of research products that will be of immediate interest to policy-makers and to the public. They cannot afford, as their colleagues in universities often can, to invest five, ten, or even fifteen years on a research project. Moreover, most private or independent think tanks do not have the luxury of relying, as many academics at universities do, on government support for their research. Although a handful of prominent think tanks continue to draw heavily on government funding, many, including the vast majority of advocacy think tanks, look to philanthropic foundations, corporations, and private donors for assistance. Furthermore, like the institutes they fund, donors have a vested interest in influencing the political climate of the day. This in large part explains why so many advocacy think tanks have been created over the past several decades. They have struck a responsive chord with donors who are prepared to support their vision of how the United States ought to be governed. Experts at think tanks understand the importance of responding to the needs of policy-makers and therefore make this a priority. They need not be reminded that securing a captive audience on Capitol Hill and/or in the White House can pay handsome dividends. By contrast, scholars at universities are rarely concerned about meeting the daily demands of policy-makers. Instead, they prefer to engage in long-term research in the hope that their findings, based on years of rigorous analysis, will help to advance the public interest. In short, scholars working at think tanks and universities have very different priorities, objectives, and timelines. This is why universities cannot be a substitute for think tanks and why think tanks cannot take the place of universities.

## Impact Answers

### World Improving/Violence Declining

#### The US is not the same – the overall historical record is decidedly improving with changes in political norms and ideas in American diplomats, which disproves their whole theory, but dispensing with moralistic totalizations is necessary to prevent future active measures

Carothers 18 [THOMAS CAROTHERS is Senior Vice President for Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 3/12. "Is the U.S. Hypocritical to Criticize Russian Election Meddling?" <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2018-03-12/us-hypocritical-criticize-russian-election-meddling>]

The U.S. response to Russian meddling in the 2016 election has been extraordinarily weak. Not only that, it has been accompanied by an attitude of “whataboutism” on the part of some Americans—the relativistic view that the United States has little ground to complain about Russia’s actions given its own history of meddling in other countries’ political campaigns and elections. It is certainly essential to be honest and realistic about the considerable record of past U.S. electoral meddling, and the contrast between Russia and the United States in this domain is certainly not black and white. Yet neither is it one of indistinguishable shades of gray. The United States is simply not engaging in electoral meddling in a manner comparable to Russia’s approach.

THE PAST IS NOT THE PRESENT

Two key flaws underlie relativist accounts. First, such a position fails to distinguish adequately between the pattern of U.S. interventionism during the Cold War, on the one hand, and U.S. activity since the end of the Cold War on the other. During the former period, the United States did indeed illegitimately intervene in numerous foreign elections, trying to tilt outcomes in favor of candidates the United States preferred and in a smaller number of cases laboring to oust legitimately elected leaders Washington saw as hostile to its security and economic interests. The record is long and dark, marked by some especially well-known cases in Guatemala and Iran in the early 1950s and in Chile and Nicaragua in the 1970s and 1980s.

Since the end of the Cold War, however, such interventionism has decreased significantly because U.S. policymakers no longer view the world as enmeshed in a global ideological struggle in which every country, no matter how small, is a critical piece on a larger strategic chessboard. Washington has thus become much less concerned about the outcomes of most foreign elections and much less engaged in trying to tilt them in any particular direction.

Of course, one can identify a few cases over the past 25 years when the United States has tried to manipulate foreign elections with the aim of getting its preferred candidate into power. When Russian President Boris Yeltsin faced reelection in 1996, the Clinton administration mobilized some economic relief to Yeltsin, to try to help him win. In the Palestinian elections of 2006, the George W. Bush administration employed U.S. economic assistance to try to bolster Fatah in its contest with Hamas (with predictably counterproductive results). In the lead up to the 2005 Iraqi elections, the Bush administration formulated a plan to funnel covert funds to favored Iraqi candidates and parties but reportedly backed away from the plan after Congress objected. In 2009, according to former Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ memoir, the United States worked behind the scenes prior to the Afghanistan elections to push President Hamid Karzai aside and keep him from winning.

There have no doubt been other cases, known only to those with access to classified information. Yet on the whole, U.S. electoral meddling has decreased significantly since the Cold War years. This is true because of the change in U.S. interests and because of an evolution of norms in many parts of the U.S. policy establishment about the acceptability of such actions. The overall picture today is of a Russia actively expanding its covert electoral meddling in multiple regions as U.S. meddling continues to decline. Those convinced that Washington must still routinely use covert means to influence election outcomes all around the world should consider the available evidence: in the last few years the rising pattern of Russian efforts to manipulate the political life of countries in central Europe, western Europe, the Balkans, the United States, and Latin America has left many telltale fingerprints—it seems highly unlikely Washington could have carried out a similar pattern of activities and not leave behind at least some noticeable traces of them.

WHAT ABOUT ALL THAT DEMOCRACY PROMOTION?

A second problematic element of the relativist position is the charge that U.S. efforts to promote democracy abroad—which make use of diplomatic leverage, democracy aid, and cooperation with pro-democratic multilateral organizations—are just another, more covert form of electoral meddling akin to what the Russians are doing. Russian President Vladimir Putin is a strong subscriber to this viewpoint, convinced that U.S. and other Western democracy programs in his country represent efforts to manipulate its domestic political life against him. Many Western observers—acutely aware of the long record of U.S. interventionism—have their suspicions as well.

U.S. pro-democracy diplomacy and assistance do indeed seek to shape the political direction of other countries. And they are carried out with a strong sense of self-interest, not out of unalloyed idealism. They are driven by the belief that democratic outcomes abroad will generally be favorable to U.S. security and economic interests by producing stable governments amenable to deeper partnerships thanks to shared political values. But unlike Russian electoral meddling, U.S. democracy promotion does not seek to exacerbate sociopolitical divisions, systematically spread lies, favor particular candidates, or undercut the technical integrity of elections. On the whole, it seeks to help citizens exercise their basic political and civil rights in electoral processes, enhance the technical integrity of such processes, and increase electoral transparency.

Skeptics reluctant to accept the idea that democracy diplomacy and assistance are not about manipulating elections should look at some recent cases—such as U.S. efforts to support Tunisia’s democratic evolution, to help Gambia resolve the blockage that followed its 2016 elections, to encourage the Hungarian government to respect media freedom and civic space, and to push the Myanmar military at the start of this decade to make room for at least some democratic political life in the country.

Skeptics should also note that although the U.S. organizations engaged in democracy work are mostly funded by the U.S. government itself, they are regularly at odds with the preferences of U.S. diplomats, who often hold on to relationships with friendly autocrats, as they are wary of the strategic value of democratic change. In the mid-1990s, this was true in Indonesia under former President Suharto and in Kazakhstan under President Nursultan Nazarbayev. And in the first decade of this century, the same occurred in Egypt under former President Hosni Mubarak and in Azerbaijan under the Aliyev family. Skeptics should also bear in mind that in most cases where the United States is engaged in promoting democracy abroad, it is working alongside and sometimes in active partnership with other democracies not known for geopolitical interventionism, such as Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden.

GRAY AREAS Although the overall case is strong for distinguishing U.S. democracy support abroad from the sort of political meddling that Russia is now making a habit of, there are several difficult issues that necessarily complicate the comparison. First, in a small but important number of cases, the United States does assist one side of a contested electoral campaign against the other. This occurs when a strongman leader of doubtful democratic fidelity is trying to legitimate himself and perpetuate his rule through elections. In various such cases, as with Chilean President Augusto Pinochet’s plebiscite in 1988, Slobodan Milosevic’s reelection campaign in 2000, and various Belarusian elections in the 2000s, the United States and a number of other Western actors offered assistance both to the opposition political forces challenging the strongman and to civic groups that were mobilizing get-out-the-vote campaigns. From the Western point of view, such actions are not interfering in a free and fair election but rather trying to help level the playing field in an election that is stacked unfairly against the challengers. From the point of view of the power holders, of course, the United States and its allies are trying to shape the outcome of the election in a partisan fashion. Second, although U.S. and other Western assistance to civil society aims to aid civic actors in their advocacy of rights and democracy—not to take sides in partisan political struggles and campaigns—the line between political society and civil society is often blurry. What to Western providers are principled civic actors working to advance universally valid political and civil rights and democratic values such as transparency and accountability, are to local authorities political animals cloaked in civic garb challenging their hold on power. This is especially true in partially or fully closed political environments such as exist in Cambodia and Venezuela, where regimes have choked off the opposition and demonstrated an ability to undermine elections. Third, despite the fact that most U.S. and Western democracy promotion is carried out in a transparent manner, some aid providers are becoming less transparent in their assistance in order to protect their recipients from being harassed or persecuted. As a result, a growing number of regimes have accused the West of engaging in clandestine political meddling. This scenario creates a vicious cycle in which undemocratic regimes charge democracy promoters of secretive meddling and persecute those they work with, thus driving such organizations to adopt less transparent methods. This in turn further reinforces the perception of secretive meddling. U.S. democracy assistance directed at Iran, for example, has become much less transparent over the past ten years as crackdowns by the Iranian government on recipients of foreign assistance have intensified. Fourth, U.S. democracy policy is markedly inconsistent, even though U.S. efforts to promote democracy in other countries are generally driven by genuine pro-democracy motives. The U.S. government makes more funds available for democracy programs in countries that the United States views as strategic enemies, such as Iran and Cuba, than it does in nondemocratic countries the United States views as strategic partners, such as Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia. The inconsistency is not absolute. Washington does make some efforts to promote democracy and rights in states ruled by “friendly tyrants.” The Trump administration’s decision last year to withhold some U.S. assistance to Egypt as a means of expressing dissatisfaction with President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s antidemocratic policies is just one example. And the fact that one is inconsistent in applying the principle does not render meaningless the applications that are made. Nevertheless, the inconsistency hurts the larger case that democracy promotion has real roots in principle.

DIVERGENT PATHS

It is not yet clear what it will take for the United States to move forward in putting together an effective response to Russian electoral meddling, but dispensing with the argument that Washington has no moral standing for objecting to such actions is certainly one necessary step. The arguments over “whataboutism” merit some careful reflection and assessment given that the facts are not simple and not all the facts are available. The United States does have a past record of electoral meddling, particularly during the Cold War. Yet the trends of U.S. and Russian behavior are divergent, not convergent—with Russia on the negative side of the divide. And although the domain of U.S. democracy promotion is hardly free of flaws and serious past mistakes, it is not the dark twin of the illicit, covert election meddling that Russia seems intent on making one of its defining signatures abroad.

### At: Structures Inevitable

#### Structures are not inevitable, but rather alterable through responsible political decision-making

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In this article, I have argued that in order for IR to remain politically relevant and critical, we must rethink and reflect on the ontological, epistemological, and methodological assumptions of the discipline. I then explored how onto-epistemologies, ethics, and political agency are interlinked. Ontologies of entanglement tend to embrace complex conceptualizations of causality and the morphogenetic properties of what exist. In a quantum world, ontological cuts happen in practices. This worldview invites a reconsideration of the way we justify and address political decisions and ethical action beyond the universalism supported by atomistic ontologies and the stifling limits imposed by substantialist-structuralism. As Nick Onuf has argued, “In a straightened world, as in a world in turmoil, talk of universal principles rings hollow… In such a world, positional ethics is the best we can hope for” (Onuf forthcoming, quoted with permission).

A quantum reconceptualization of our being in the world and our relation to matter calls for a profound sense of modesty, as well as for the central role of responsibility for taking political decisions. In an entangled world that is not governed by theoretically detectable, linear, and immutable laws of history, but instead by intra-agential processes, the conditions of possibility for political agency are rooted in the morphogenetic properties of practices. Taking responsibility for critically questioning what exists without the hubris of assuming our ability to ordain outcomes displays an affinity with Foucault’s methodological and political project. In this vein, ethical guidelines may not be grounded on abstractions stemming from the solitary ruminations of an individual’s mind. Prudence, responsibility, and practices of cultivation of the self offer pathways to overcome the limitations of the Kantian categorical imperative by which universal prescriptions are the main way of validating ethical choices. As Patomäki has shown, universalism may elicit exclusionary and violent practices. Moreover, as Connolly has argued, the nostalgia for a slowly moving world regulated by linear relations of causality and characterized by certainty and stability may be the root of fundamentalism.

Furthermore, if we accept Barad’s position that we are “of the world” and not above the world, theorizing looks more like a practice endowed with performative political effects than a quest for the discovery of the “true nature” of what exists. Therefore, intellectual undertakings are a form of political agency and come with great responsibility. Such responsibility requires the need for exercising prudence in making truth statements about what is universally good or naturally inevitable. Assumptions about linearity of causal relations, universal laws of history, or ontological properties of entities yield two problematic effects. On the one hand, they may stifle political imagination; on the other hand, they could encourage actions based upon abstract prescriptions rather than upon careful diagnosis of the forces that obtain in the situation at hand. In an entangled world, there are no externalities. Arguments that divert responsibility by basing political choices upon abstract principles or aspirations and, as a result, that treat what happens on the ground as “unintended consequences” or “collateral damage,” are ethically thin and politically dangerous.

In fact, unintended consequences may well be the result of irresponsible political decision-making that does not include a competent assessment of the practical configurations that constitute the context of action and the means necessary to achieve stated goals. Such attitudes, Amoureux and Steele (2014) have suggested, have led to disastrous initiatives, such as the Bush administration’s invasion of Iraq. Likewise, Kennedy (2006) has shown that the bland rhetoric of jus in bello that provides standardized criteria regarding the number of acceptable civilian casualties (conveniently called collateral damage) produces the effect of diverting responsibility from those who conduct war while assuaging their consciences concerning the injuries and deaths their choices are inflicting. Kennedy (2004) has also shown that as a result of the preference for universal normativity, the human rights profession (which he calls “the invisible college”) is more concerned with protecting abstract norms than with acting politically so as to devise viable solutions to specific problems.

Universal norms and bureaucratic routines play a major role in prescribing and justifying UN peacekeeping interventions. As Jean Marie Guehénno argued more than a decade ago, strategies of international intervention based upon assumptions of causal linearity and invariance may amount to hubris. Norms and rules can also offer grounds for appeasement. The massacres that occurred in Rwanda and Srebrenica in the 1990s provide examples of how, by uncritically following institutionalized rules, United Nations peacekeepers permitted atrocities. UN employees are not cold-blooded monsters or extremely callous individuals. They follow norms and rules, key examples of which include the principle of “impartiality,” Security Council mandates, and “rules of engagement.” By doing so, however, they have often fallen short of considering the possible consequences of decisions in specific situations. The United Nations’ failure to take action to prevent the Rwanda and Srebrenica genocide testifies to the fact that following universal norms (i.e., the imperative to preserve impartiality) and bureaucratic reasoning (i.e., the rules of engagement prescribing not to intervene to disarm any party of the conflict) set the stage for avoiding a careful assessment of what was at stake on the eve of the massacres. These ways of reasoning also appeased consciences for not making decisions accountable to the people in danger (Zanotti 2014).

Significantly, the lack of prudence that derives from broad overgeneralizations and reliance on abstractions, rather than careful consideration of what the case demands, threatens more self-defeating outcomes in peacekeeping and international politics. This is why a careful reflection of the ways our political choices are validated ontologically and epistemologically is of paramount practical importance. Seven decades ago, Carr (1946) advocated the need for conceptualizing political agency and ethics in a way that addresses both the limits of the idealist illusion regarding the possibility to transform reality through acts of will as well as the realist persuasion about the inescapable subordination of actors to external conditions. Both of these positions, Carr pointed out, lead to self-defeating outcomes and stifle political imagination because they focus on general abstractions, failing to take into consideration what conditions and political opportunity actually obtain in specific historical configurations.

Here I have proposed that an ontology of entanglement fosters an ethic of engagement and activism along the lines suggested by Foucault and opens up possibilities for political action. In this ontological horizon, what qualifies as meaningful agency is not stifled by the structuralist commitment to the stabilizing effects of structures (like in Waltz’s) or by the inescapable features of an oppressive and alienating social order that dispossess subjects of their humanity and reduces them to “bare life” (as in Agamben). Instead, micropolitical interventions, parrēsia, and the cultivation of a particular kind of character, while not revolutionizing the status quo, may be relevant to triggering social change. Importantly, ontologies of entanglement also raise the bar for adjudicating the ethical validity of political choices. Radical assumption of responsibility drastically limits what is acceptable as “unintended consequences.” This is important for the way international organizations make decisions regarding international peacekeeping interventions and for the way politicians decide to wage war. Ethically and politically sound decision-making cannot be based mainly upon the apodictic recognition of universal rules of behavior, abstract aspirations, or overarching theories of the functioning of society. They must also include careful analysis of how clusters of causes may generate effects in the specific contexts at hand and take responsibility for the ontological cuts our initiatives operate and for the morphogenetic processes they may set off.